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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Spinoff-Gründungen aus der Wissenschaft werden häufig als ein effektiver Weg des Wissens- 
und Technologietransfers angesehen, um Forschungsergebnisse wirtschaftlich anzuwenden zu 
und erfolgreich zu kommerzialisieren. Dabei wird selten beachtet, dass Spinoff-Gründungen 
durch Wissenschaftler höhere soziale Kosten verursachen als Neugründungen durch 
Ausbildungsabgänger oder in der Privatwirtschaft Beschäftigte. Denn bei 
Unternehmensgründungen durch Wissenschaftler kann das in der Wissenschaft akkumulierte 
Wissen verloren gehen, und anstelle einer Veröffentlichung von erzielten 
Forschungsergebnisse mit positiven Spillover-Effekten tritt die rein private Nutzung. Um 
diese höheren sozialen Kosten auszugleichen, sollten Spinoff-Gründungen durch 
Wissenschaftler höhere soziale Erträge erzielen, indem sie eine bessere Performance 
aufweisen. 
Auf Basis eines repräsentativen Datensatzes zu Unternehmensgründungen in 
wissensintensiven Wirtschaftszweigen in Deutschland zeigt der vorliegende Aufsatz, dass 
Spinoff-Gründungen aus der Wissenschaft - d.h. Unternehmensgründungen, an denen 
zumindest eine Person beteiligt ist, die zuvor in einer Wissenschaftseinrichtung gearbeitet 
haben oder dies während der Unternehmensgründung noch tun - ein höheres 
Beschäftigungswachstum um durchschnittlich 3,4 Prozentpunkte aufweisen. Der 
Performanceunterschied ist größer, wenn die Gründer selbst in der wissenschaftlichen 
Forschung (z.B. als Professoren oder wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter) tätig waren. Spinoff-
Gründungen, an denen Gründer aus den Rechts- und Sozialwissenschaften oder den 
Naturwissenschaften beteiligt sind, weisen ebenfalls ein höheres Wachstum auf. 
Executive Summary 
The creation of spinoff companies is often promoted as a desirable mechanism for transferring 
knowledge and technologies from research organizations to the private sector for 
commercialization.  However, when university spinoffs involve an employment transition by 
a researcher out of the not-for-profit sector, the creation of a university spinoff is likely to 
impose a higher social cost than the creation of an industry startup.  To offset this higher 
social cost which arise from the lost knowledge accumulation and disclosure in the not-for-
profit research sector, university spinoffs must produce a larger stream of social benefits than 
industry startups, a performance premium.   
Using data on new ventures founded in knowledge intensive industries in Germany and 
controlling for survivor bias, this paper finds that university spinoffs generally show greater 
employment growth than industry startups.  For the overall group of university spinoffs, 
which are defined as new companies started by former or current university employees, the 
performance premium is 3.4 percentage points higher employment growth.  This premium is 
higher for research academic entrepreneurs than non-research academic entrepreneurs.  We 
also find performance differences by academic discipline, with higher employment growth for 
spinoffs with academic founders from law & social science or natural sciences.  By creating 
more new jobs than industry startups, university spinoffs are offsetting their higher social 
cost, at least to some degree.   
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Abstract 
The creation of spinoff companies is often promoted as a desirable mechanism for 
transferring knowledge and technologies from research organizations to the 
private sector for commercialization.  In the promotion process, policymakers 
typically treat these “university” spinoffs like industry startups.  However, when 
university spinoffs involve an employment transition by a researcher out of the 
not-for-profit sector, the creation of a university spinoff is likely to impose a 
higher social cost than the creation of an industry startup.  To offset this higher 
social cost, university spinoffs must produce a larger stream of social benefits than 
industry startups, a performance premium.  This paper outlines the arguments why 
the social costs of entrepreneurship are likely to be higher for academic 
entrepreneurs and empirically investigates the existence of a performance 
premium using a sample of German startup companies.  We find that university 
spinoffs exhibit a performance premium of 3.4 percentage points higher 
employment growth over industry startups.  The analysis also shows that the 
performance premium varies across types of academic entrepreneurs and 
founders’ academic disciplines.   
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1 Introduction 
Many national governments and public research organizations have implemented policies to 
promote the formation of university spinoff companies, reflecting a shift in the culture and 
mission of public research organizations toward an entrepreneurial paradigm (Etzkowitz 
2004, Etzkowitz et al. 2000, OECD 2000, Lockett and Wright 2005, O’Shea et al. 2005, 
Mustar and Wright 2010).  For instance, university administrators are expanding the practice 
of accepting equity in lieu of licensing fees and choosing to invest directly in spinoff 
companies (Desruisseaux 2000, Feldman et al. 2002, Di Gregorio and Shane 2003, Shane 
2004).  When combined with the growing use of venture capital and small firm financing 
programs, university researchers are increasingly involved in the most extreme form of 
entrepreneurial behavior – working part-time or full-time on commercialization in a spinoff 
company.3 
 
Fostering technology transfer by incenting university researchers to form spinoff companies 
involves a potentially costly trade-off that is seldom (if ever) considered in policy discussions.  
Unlike startups formed by individuals already working in the private sector, university 
researchers must undertake an employment transition out of the not-for-profit research sector.  
As these academic entrepreneurs pursue commercialization, less time and cognitive effort is 
devoted to university research and their contribution to knowledge accumulation and 
disclosure decreases.  The sacrifice of public research to pursue commercialization, especially 
when it involves the most productive university researchers, imposes a costly “brain drain” on 
the not-for-profit research sector (Toole and Czarnitzki 2010).   
 
From a societal perspective, university spinoff policies are effective when they create 
incentives that produce a net gain in social welfare.  This can be achieved when the social 
costs from lost knowledge accumulation and disclosure in the not-for-profit research sector 
are more than offset by the social benefits created through successful performance of 
                                                 
3 Throughout the paper we will use “university” as shorthand for all public research organizations (PROs) in the 
not-for-profit sector. 
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university spinoffs in the private sector.  Because the social costs of undertaking 
entrepreneurship are likely to be higher for academic entrepreneurs relative to industry 
entrepreneurs (since the contributions to “open science” by industry entrepreneurs are 
unlikely to change much when undertaking employment transitions within the private sector), 
university spinoffs must create a larger stream of social benefits than industry startups to 
produce an equivalent net gain in social welfare.  In this sense, university spinoffs must 
achieve a “performance premium” relative to industry startups in order justify the adoption of 
university spinoff policies as a mechanism for technology transfer.   
 
In light of the definitional inconsistencies found in the literature, it is important to be clear 
about the type of university spinoffs that necessitate a performance premium.  There are two 
important elements.  First, a university employee must undertake a partial or complete 
employment transition from the not-for-profit sector to the private sector.  We refer to these 
individuals as academic entrepreneurs.3  Second, the new company employing the academic 
entrepreneur must be based largely on the research results generated during his/her activity at 
the university.  This second element restricts attention to university research staff such as 
professors, research scientists, and other employees who participate and contribute to open 
science.  The transition to the private sector by these individuals is likely to involve some 
sacrifice of knowledge accumulation and disclosure which generates the social cost 
necessitating a performance premium for their spinoffs. We refer to these individuals as 
“research academic entrepreneurs” and their companies as “research spinoffs”.  All other 
academic entrepreneurs are referred to as “non-research academic entrepreneurs” and their 
companies are called “non-research spinoffs”.    
 
There is a small but growing literature that examines whether university spinoffs involving 
academic entrepreneurs perform better or worse than industry startups or spinoffs.  Several 
studies find that university spinoffs are less likely to fail than industry startups (Nerkar and 
                                                 
3 In our definition, a new company is a university spinoff when it involves an academic entrepreneur.  New 
companies that were formed to commercialize a university technology (e.g. through the technology transfer 
office) or that received some kind of support from the university do not qualify as university spinoffs under our 
definition unless they also have an academic entrepreneur in the founding team.   
 3 
Shane 2003, Rothaermel and Thursby 2005, Zhang 2009, Cantner and Goethner 2011).  Toole 
and Czarnitzki (2007, 2009) find that firms with an academic entrepreneur perform better in 
terms of proof of concept research, patenting, and the receipt of follow-on venture capital 
investment.  However, the results are mixed when considering other indicators of 
performance such as sales and employment.  Zahra et al. (2007) find that university spinoffs 
performed better in terms of revenue growth, but worse in terms of return on assets and sales 
per employee.  Ensley and Hmieleski (2005) and Wennberg et al. (2011) also find lower sales 
growth for university spinoffs.  For employment growth, Wennberg et al. (2011) and 
Colombo and Piva (2005) find no significant differences, but Cantner and Goethner (2011) 
find that university spinoffs exhibit significantly lower employment growth.  
 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature.  First, we outline the reasons why the 
social costs of entrepreneurship are likely to be larger for academic entrepreneurs.  From this 
conceptual development, it is clear that the required performance premium is not constant 
across all types of university spinoffs, but depends on the foregone contributions of the 
academic entrepreneurs to knowledge accumulation and disclosure in the not-for-profit 
research sector at the time the spinoff is founded.  Second, we undertake an empirical analysis 
to investigate the existence of a performance premium for university spinoffs using a 
representative sample of German startup companies while controlling for potential survival 
bias that would otherwise lead to an overestimate of any performance premium.  Our data, 
which represent knowledge intensive industries, allow us to differentiate between research 
and non-research academic entrepreneurs and control for the academic discipline of the 
founders.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the reasons why the social costs 
of university spinoffs are likely to be larger and define the performance premium.  This 
section also reviews recent studies on firm performance of university spinoffs.  Section 3 
describes the empirical model and the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and 
section 5 concludes with some reflections on the main findings and policy implications. 
 4 
2 Theory and Hypotheses 
The social costs of university spinoffs and the performance premium 
The existence of a performance premium for university spinoffs relative to industry startups 
stems from the change in knowledge production and disclosure practices that take place when 
university researchers transition out of the not-for-profit research sector.  Prior to this 
transition, university researchers contribute to knowledge production in an “open science” 
institutional environment.  Their choices about research projects and disclosure are largely 
governed by the “priority reward” system of incentives (Dasgupta and David 1994, Stephan 
1996).  As Dasgupta and David (1994) describe, the priority reward system serves to direct 
research toward socially valuable outcomes (at least as interpreted by the community of 
scientific peers), speed up knowledge discovery, and promote rapid public dissemination.  
After transitioning to a spinoff in the private sector, however, academic entrepreneurs are 
subject to a new set of incentives and rewards that favor the pursuit of commercial 
opportunities and the exploitation of rents from new knowledge by restricting public 
disclosure. 
 
One part of the potential social cost of university spinoffs is the subsequent decrease in the 
production of academic research.  The literature on the economics of science and 
technological change offers a substantial body of evidence supporting the idea that academic 
research is important for innovation and productivity growth.  For instance, Jaffe (1989) 
presents evidence that university research contributes to state-level corporate patenting. 
Adams (1990) shows that cumulative stocks of academic research stimulate productivity 
growth in manufacturing industries. Toole (2012) finds that university research makes a 
significant contribution to drug innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.4  Unlike university 
spinoffs involving academic researchers, industry startups do not adversely affect the 
productive capacity for academic research. 
 
Another part of the potential social cost of university spinoffs is the subsequent decrease in 
the disclosure of knowledge.  Disclosure permits the stock of public knowledge to be 
                                                 
4 See Salter and Martin (2001) for an overview. 
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cumulative, accessible, and reliable.  It limits duplication of research efforts, allows new 
knowledge to be replicated and verified by professional peers, and permits access and use by 
other researchers which enhances opportunities for complementary research (Dasgupta and 
David 1994).  In recent work, Murray et al. (2009) find that greater access to ideas and 
materials in academic research not only increased incentives for direct follow-on research, but 
led to an increase in the diversity of research by increasing the number of experimental 
research lines.  Mukherjee and Stern (2009), who examined the theoretical conditions 
supporting “open science” versus “secrecy”, stress that maintaining and growing the stock of 
public knowledge requires a limit on the private financial returns obtained through secrecy. 
Relative to a secrecy system, open science is considered to be an efficient and welfare 
enhancing system for the production of scientific and technical knowledge (Dasgupta and 
David 1994, Mukherjee and Stern 2009). 
 
The literature contains a handful of studies that examine how research productivity is affected 
when university researchers become involved in spinoff companies.5  For academic 
entrepreneurs who remain full-time at their research institutions, the findings are mixed.  
Lowe and Gonzalez-Brambila (2007) find an increase in publication output for engineering 
faculty, but for science faculty, their publication output is not significantly different from the 
control group.  Analyzing Max Planck scholars, Buenstorf (2009) shows that both 
publications and citations decrease significantly.  When academic researchers work part-time 
or full-time at the for-profit company the emerging evidence is stronger that research 
productivity falls.  For a sample of biomedical scientists supported by the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), Toole and Czarnitzki (2010) find significant decreases in 
publications, journal impact factor weighted publications, and grantsmanship.  Their most 
conservative estimate shows a 26% drop in average publication output per year for each 
academic entrepreneur (also see Czarnitzki and Toole 2010).   
 
                                                 
5 There is a much broader literature studying the influence of patenting and industry sponsorship on academic 
research (see, for instance, Agrawal and Henderson 2002, Azoulay et al. 2009, Breschi et al. 2007, Czarnitzki et 
al. 2009, 2012, Rosenberg 1998).  
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Most of these studies find that spinoff involvement by university researchers is associated 
with a reduction in academic research productivity.6  The stream of benefits that would have 
resulted from this lost research represents a social cost attributable to the employment 
transition of university researchers out of the not-for-profit research environment.  Because 
industry entrepreneurs do not transition across sectors to start a new company, industry 
startups do not impose a social cost from lost knowledge accumulation or disclosure.  While 
employment transitions within the private sector also involve trade-offs, the mobility of labor 
across industries through mechanisms such as entrepreneurship are usually seen as welfare 
enhancing when consumer preferences are expressed through market signals.  This suggests 
that the social costs from private sector entrepreneurship are likely to be low.  From a societal 
perspective, university spinoffs that involve an academic entrepreneur must create a larger 
stream of social benefits than industry startups to offset their higher social cost.  That is, 
university spinoffs must achieve a performance premium relative to industry startups to 
produce an equivalent gain in social welfare.  Policies that promote university spinoffs 
involving academic entrepreneurs implicitly assume a performance premium exists.  This 
leads to our first hypothesis:   
 
(H1) University spinoffs involving an academic entrepreneur will show a performance 
premium relative to industry startups, ceteris paribus. 
 
It is important to recognize that the size of the performance premium is not constant across all 
types of university spinoffs.7  Its size will depend on the identity of the academic 
entrepreneur.  For instance, the performance premium will need to be near its maximum size 
in order to outweigh social costs when “star” scientists are involved in spinoffs.  At the other 
extreme, no performance premium would be necessary for an academic entrepreneur who 
                                                 
6 The current body of empirical evidence on changes in research productivity is limited to samples drawn from 
science and engineering fields.  Importantly, the theoretical argument about the potential social costs of 
university spinoffs is not limited to any particular field of study.  For instance, academic researchers in law and 
social science fields may reduce their contributions to open science when pursuing entrepreneurship.  Given the 
stage of research in the literature, there is no information available that would suggest one field of study is more 
socially valuable than another.  
7 The stream of benefits that would have been derived from a university researcher’s future contributions to 
academic research and disclosure is an unobservable counterfactual since the academic entrepreneur cannot be 
observed as both a full-time university researcher and a spinoff entrepreneur at the same time.  This complicates 
any attempt to directly estimate of the necessary size of the performance premium. 
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does not contribute (or is not expected to contribute) to knowledge accumulation and 
disclosure.  From a societal perspective, the performance premium implicit in university 
spinoff policies is larger when the expected loss in academic research productivity is larger.  
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
(H2) University spinoffs involving a research academic entrepreneur will show a larger 
performance premium than university spinoffs with a non-research academic entrepreneur, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
University spinoff performance:  Might we expect a performance premium? 
The hypotheses stated above specify what we would like to see from a policy perspective, but 
based on the existing literature, is it reasonable to expect university spinoffs to perform better 
than industry startups?  Scholars highlight differences in market opportunities, the human and 
social capital of the founder(s), and connections to universities as determinants of 
performance.  Looking at the literature, however, one finds different theoretical perspectives 
as well conflicting empirical results.8 
 
Some scholars suggest that university spinoffs will perform better due to a competitive 
advantage in selecting and/or exploiting market opportunities.  Using a theoretical model, 
Lacetera (2009) argues that university researchers face higher opportunity costs of 
undertaking entrepreneurship than do industry entrepreneurs.  For a given set of market 
opportunities, academic entrepreneurs select those opportunities with greater expected 
revenues and this leads university spinoffs to perform better than industry startups.  Another 
source of better performance could be access to radical technologies that provide a 
competitive advantage for exploiting market opportunities (Shane 2001, Nerkar and Shane 
2003).  Researchers who participate in the discovery of new technologies may enter the 
market early with a first-mover advantage leading to better growth opportunities.  For 
example, the method of recombinant DNA was a radical technology that allowed the founders 
                                                 
8 See Rothaermel et al. (2007) and Helm and Mauroner (2007) for recent reviews of the literature. 
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of Genentech to gain a significant competitive advantage over traditional pharmaceutical 
manufacturers (Kenney 1986, Zucker and Darby 1998).  
 
Against these arguments, other scholars suggest that university researchers are not able to 
identify the most profitable market opportunities or stress that university technologies are 
often too early-stage to be exploited effectively.  Shane (2000) argues that differences 
between entrepreneurs in their prior knowledge of markets, how to serve markets, and how to 
identify customer needs lead to the discovery of different market opportunities, even with the 
same technology.  In this sense, industry entrepreneurs may be able to identify more valuable 
market opportunities leading to better startup performance (also see Druilhe and Garnsey 
2004, Vohora et al. 2004, Wennberg et al. 2011).  Given the early-stage nature of many 
university-based discoveries, university spinoffs are likely to face more technological and 
market uncertainty.  Higher uncertainty exacerbates information asymmetries that may limit 
access to human and financial resources needed for spinoff growth (Shane 2004, Toole and 
Czarnitzki 2007, Wright et al. 2004b, Lockett and Wright, 2003).    
 
The literature also suggests different growth prospects for university spinoffs based on the 
human and social capital of the academic entrepreneurs.  The specialized human capital of 
academic entrepreneurs can be a source of firm-specific capabilities and superior 
performance.  Looking at “star” scientists, Zucker et al. (2002) find that various measures of 
success for biotechnology firms such as patents and products in development significantly 
increase with the degree of involvement by university scientists.  For a sample of companies 
in the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program, Toole and Czarnitzki (2007, 
2009) show that firms with an academic entrepreneur perform better in terms of patents, proof 
of concept research, and raising venture capital investment.  Colombo and Piva (2005) also 
find that university spinoffs are more innovative than industry startups, but this difference did 
not carry over to their results on growth.  With respect to social capital, several studies 
suggest that academic entrepreneurs are more embedded in the scientific community which 
may facilitate establishing and exploiting collaborative relationships with universities and 
help to attract venture capital investment (Nicolaou and Birley 2003a,b, Murray 2004).  Using 
data on MIT start-ups, Shane and Stuart (2002) find that social network ties to investors 
(angel funding or venture capital) decrease the probability of failure and increase the 
likelihood of venture capital funding, although they did not explicitly identify those firms 
with an academic entrepreneur on the founding team. 
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Other scholars posit that university spinoffs are likely to perform worse than industry startups 
because the human capital of academic entrepreneurs is too academic.  The nature of the 
human capital scientists develop over the course of their careers is shaped by the institutional 
incentive systems characterizing their work environments as well as the evolution of 
opportunities (Dasgupta and David 1994, Stephan 1996, Nelson 2004).  University scientists 
who are particularly adept at pursing “academic goals,” who we think of as individuals with a 
specialized form of human capital that is honed for identifying and exploring academic 
opportunities, may not be well suited for advancing invention in an industrial research 
environment.  This suggests that academic entrepreneurs may lack the commercial skills, 
market knowledge or the ability to balance between timeliness and scientific accuracy of 
research activities, which together may result in a worse business performance compared to 
industry startups.  Toole and Czarnitzki (2009) find that academic entrepreneurs contribute to 
patenting, but this contribution falls as their science-oriented human capital increases – a form 
of diminishing returns to science-oriented human capital.  Ensley and Hmieleski (2005) 
expect university spinoffs to perform worse because the top management team is more 
homogeneous and has less developed working dynamics.  Wennberg et al. (2011) find that 
university spinoffs exhibit lower survival and slower sales growth than corporate spinoffs.  
They attribute the superior performance of corporate spinoffs to more exposure to market 
knowledge during the industry entrepreneurs’ careers outside academia. 
 
Connections to universities could benefit both spinoffs and industry startups by allowing 
access to new knowledge, students, training, and other resources.  The overall literature 
studying the effects of such “science linkages” on firm performance is quite broad and 
diverse.  Spinoffs or industry startups could be connected to universities through a wide range 
of channels such as joint research projects, performing contract research for the university, 
contracting research out to the university, sending employees to the university for training, 
accepting student interns at the company, or maintaining informal contacts.  In the empirical 
analysis, a dummy variable is used to control for university connections.   
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3 Empirical Model and Data  
Model 
To investigate our hypotheses about the performance premium, we analyze the relative 
growth of university spinoffs and industry startups in knowledge intensive industries.  Spinoff 
performance can be viewed from a number of different perspectives such as innovation in 
products or services, sales, market value, or employment.  For the performance premium, we 
require an indicator that captures a socially valuable outcome that can be interpreted as 
offsetting the social cost of lost knowledge accumulation and disclosure in the not-for-profit 
research sector.  Innovation indicators such as patents are probably poor candidates since the 
economic value of most patents is extremely low.  In this paper, we focus on employment 
growth.  The creation of new jobs is arguably one of the most important outcomes of 
entrepreneurship (World Bank 2012).  In the empirical analysis, employment growth is 
measured in terms of the annualized logarithmic change in the number of employees between 
the first year of commercial operation of a new venture (s), and a reference year (t).  
 
Heckman selection models are used to control for potential survivor bias in the population of 
new ventures over time.9  The outcome equation models employment growth as a function of 
the characteristics of the founding team, resource endowments of the new venture at the time 
of entering the market, and aspects of its external environment (see Storey 1994).  A dummy 
variable, called AE, identifies university spinoffs as new venture(s) with an academic 
entrepreneur(s) as part of the founding team.  To examine hypothesis #1, the outcome 
equation in the Heckman model has the following form: 
 
Where the subscript i represents new ventures and “Control Variables” is shorthand for all 
other covariates in the regression specification.  The coefficient on AE captures the difference 
in employment growth between university spinoffs and industry startups.  If university 
spinoffs exhibit a performance premium for employment growth, the coefficient  will be 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Heckman (1976), (1979), or Verbeek (2012: 248-252) for details on the Heckman selection model. 
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positive and statistically significant.  λi denotes the selection term also known as Heckman’s 
lambda or inverse mills ratio.  
 
For hypothesis #2, we define two additional dummy variables in order to split university 
spinoffs into subgroups.  Research_AE takes the value of one for university spinoffs with a 
research academic entrepreneur(s) as part of the founding team.  Similarly, Non_Research 
_AE is defined to be one when the university spinoff has a non-research academic 
entrepreneur(s) on the founding team.  In this case, the outcome equation in the Heckman 
model has the following form: 

 
Once again the coefficients  and  capture the performance premiums for university 
spinoffs.  However, because research academic entrepreneurs are likely to be associated with 
a larger social cost, we would like to observe  >  in order to find support for university 
spinoff policies from a societal perspective. 
 
Sample and Survey Method 
Our empirical analysis is based on a survey of German firms that were founded in the five 
years 1996 to 2000 in “knowledge intensive industries”, i.e. in high-tech manufacturing and in 
those service sectors where new technologies and human capital are important for 
competitiveness (see Appendix 1 for a definition of the sectors used).  The new ventures were 
surveyed by telephone interviews, using stratified random sampling combined with quota 
sampling.  For each stratum in the gross sample, new ventures were ordered randomly and 
interviews were conducted until a target figure of successful interviews in each stratum was 
reached.  We used sector groups (high-tech manufacturing, technology-oriented services, 
knowledge-intensive consulting), year of foundation (1996-2000), and region (separating 
three types of regions according to the existence of research universities in the region, and 
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their entrepreneurial orientation) as stratification criteria and applied a disproportional 
weighting, oversampling high-tech manufacturing and regions with research universities.  
Interviews were conducted with a person that was part of the founding team.  The interviews 
took place from late October to early December 2001.  The new ventures were between one 
year (for start-ups founded at the end of 2000) and almost 6 years (for start-ups founded at the 
beginning of 1996) old at the time of the interviews. 
 
The sample was drawn from the Mannheim Foundation Panel (MFP) of the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW).  This data set contains almost all firms founded in 
Germany since 1989 and rests on information from Germany’s largest credit rating agency, 
Creditreform.  In principle, only firms meeting a minimum threshold of economic activity 
enter the database.  Creditreform transmits information twice a year on newly founded firms 
to ZEW where it is transformed into a panel data structure (see Almus et al. 2000).  Among 
others, the MFP contains data on founding date, personal characteristics of founders, 
description of economic activity, credit rating and employment. 
 
The total number of new ventures surveyed is 20,241.  In order to realize this number of 
interviews, a total of 57,022 firms had to be contacted.  Those firms that were contacted but 
with whom no interview could be performed fell into two groups: (1) firms that refused to 
participate in the survey or could not be contacted during the interview period because the 
interviewee was not available (n=25,359) and (2) firms for which the existing contact details 
turned out to be incorrect and no better contact information could be identified (n=11,422). 
The response rate of surveyed firms to the total number of successfully contacted firms at the 
time of survey was 44.2%.  
 
It turned out that 19.4% of the surveyed firms were actually founded prior to 1996. In most of 
these cases, the founding data contained in the MFP indicated a change in legal form of the 
company, while the real market entry took place earlier. A further 3.0% of the surveyed firms 
were founded as subsidiaries by other companies and are thus regarded as non-original new 
ventures.  After omitting these firms, we also filtered out extreme observations by trimming 
the top and bottom of the employment distribution growth at the 99.5 and 0.5 percentiles, 
respectively.  The net sample we use for further analysis consists of 14,844 new ventures. 
 13 
These represent about 5% of the total estimated number of new ventures in Germany within 
the 5 year period and in the sectors covered by the survey. 
 
Due to budget constraints, a smaller telephone questionnaire was given to industry startups 
than was given to university spinoff companies.  The smaller questionnaire still included 
many items.  For instance, it asked about the number of firm founders, the education of the 
founders, the employment at the new venture at founding and at the time of the interview, in-
house R&D activities, and ongoing collaboration with universities.10 New ventures involving 
an academic entrepreneur (e.g. university spinoffs) were asked additional questions such as 
the academic background of the university founder(s), their university employment status, the 
name of the parent institutions, and the use of university knowledge (see Egeln et al. 2003 for 
more details on the questionnaire and descriptive results).  
 
For those new ventures in the gross sample that could not be successfully contacted due to 
incorrect contact details (e.g. invalid phone number), we analyzed whether these firms have 
indeed exited the market prior to the time of interviews.  We use information contained in the 
MFP on bankruptcy, insolvency, deregistration from company registers, voluntary closures 
and other rating-related information for this purpose.  About ninety-seven percent (11,100 out 
of the 11,422 not successfully contacted) were identified as non-surviving firms.  This is 
equal to an exit ratio of 19.5% of all contacted new ventures.  This high exit ratio 
demonstrates that the sample of surveyed new ventures may be a distorted sample of the 
population of all newly started businesses in the knowledge intensive sectors of the German 
economy that entered the market between 1996 and 2000 since many of these new ventures 
ceased business soon after start.  Since the variables that explain why a new venture ceased 
business may be correlated with the variables that explain growth of surviving new ventures, 
we control for a likely survival bias by using a Heckman selection model. 
 
                                                 
10 Recall that we will use the term “university” when referring to any type of science institution.  With respect to 
the German situation, science institutions primarily comprise state-funded universities and other publicly funded 
research organisations (such as Max Planck Institutes, Fraunhofer Institutes and governmental laboratories and 
research centres) as well as a few private universities. 
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Data and variables in the Selection (Survival) Model 
The selection model for the Heckman procedure uses data from the Mannheim Foundation 
Panel (MFP) to model the probability of survival for new ventures in knowledge intensive 
industries.  MFP information on the population of new ventures includes the founding year, 
industry (NACE 5-digit), location, equity ownership by other firms, credit rating, number of 
firm founders, family status, real estate property of firm founders, and the highest level of 
formal educational attainment.  The endogenous variable in the survival model is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the startup was active in 2001 and zero if (1) a startup 
could not be successfully contacted during the telephone interview due to incorrect contact 
details or (2) the startup was identified as not economically active at the end of 2001 from 
MFP.  The covariates in the selection equation include the following:  founding year dummy 
variables, industry dummy variables, regional dummy variables, startup equity held by 
another firm, formal educational attainment, real estate property owned by firm founders.   
 
Variables in Growth Model 
The endogenous variable, employment growth, is measured by the annualized logarithmic 
change in the number of employees in the first year of firm activity to the end of 2001.  The 
explanatory variables fall into three categories.  The first category includes characteristics of 
the founding team.  The following founding team covariates are used: 
AE A dummy variable equal to one if the new venture had at least one 
university employee (former or current) on the founding team.  
These individuals are called academic entrepreneurs and their firms 
are categorized as university spinoffs. 
Research_AE A dummy variable that is equal to one if the university spinoff had 
at least one academic entrepreneur that was involved in university 
research.  To make this distinction, we asked the university spinoffs 
whether new research results generated during their activity at the 
university were essential or at least very important for starting the 
business.  Research results include scientific discoveries or 
methods, techniques and technologies developed at university. 
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Non_Research_AE A dummy variable that is equal to one if the university spinoff had 
at least one academic entrepreneur that was not a university 
researcher.  This group is identified from the difference between the 
total number of university spinoffs and the number of spinoffs with 
a research academic entrepreneur. 
% Academic Degree This variable captures the general human capital of the founding 
team.  It is measured as the percentage of founding team members 
with an academic degree.  Academic degree refers to any tertiary 
education level.  
Team Size The number of people on the founding team. 
 
The second category includes characteristics of new the venture at the time of founding.  The 
following covariates are used: 
Science A dummy variable indicating that the university spinoff had at least 
one academic entrepreneur from the natural or life science 
disciplines.  Natural and life science include physics, chemistry, 
biology, medicine, pharmacology, geology and mathematics. 
Engineering A dummy variable indicating that the university spinoff had at least 
one academic entrepreneur from engineering.  Engineering fields 
include mechanical and electrical engineering, civil engineering, 
architecture and planning and other engineering. 
Other Field A dummy variable indicating that the university spinoff had at least 
one academic entrepreneur whose field of study was law or social 
science disciplines such as business administration, economics, 
psychology and so forth.  
Firm Patent A dummy variable indicating the new venture had at least one 
patent.  
Firm R&D (cont) A dummy variable indicating that the new venture conducts in-
house research and development (R&D) activities on a continuous 
basis.  The survey used the same definition and phrasing as the 
Community Innovation Surveys of Eurostat.  
 16 
Firm R&D (occ) A dummy variable indicating that the new venture conducts in-
house research and development (R&D) activities on an occasional 
basis.  The survey used the same definition and phrasing as the 
Community Innovation Surveys of Eurostat. 
Employees at founding The number of employees at the new venture in the first year of 
economic activity.  The number of employees is measured in full 
time equivalents and includes the founders themselves (as long as 
they actively contribute labor), salaried employees, trainees, student 
apprentices and freelancers.  
Credit rating The credit rating of the new venture was obtained from 
Creditreform.  This covariate controls for access to external 
financial capital.  Creditreform uses a scale from 100 to 600 with 
100 representing the best and 600 representing the worst rating.  
We normalize the scale to be between 1 and 6. 
Limited liability Comp A dummy variable indicating that the new venture was founded 
under a legal form that limits the founders liability.  For instance, 
one legal form limits the founders’ liability to the amount of equity 
invested at the start of the business.  However, it requires a higher 
minimum equity for starting the business and may complicate 
access to external capital.   
The third category includes characteristics related to the new venture’s external environment 
which includes any connections to universities.  The covariates in this category include: 
Connections A dummy variable indicating that the new venture maintains any 
connection to a university in the post-foundation period.  For the 
regression models in Table 2, any connection includes joint 
research, contracting in, contracting out, employee training, student 
interns, and regular informal contact.     
Industry A set of eight dummy variables controlling for the industry in 
which the new venture is active.  The list of industries appears in 
Appendix 1. 
Cohort This is a set of year dummy variables that indicate the year the new 
venture was founded.  It controls for annual cohort effects for new 
 17 
ventures founded in different years, 1996-2000, which may result, 
among others, from differences in business climate. 
4 Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of new ventures in Germany’s 
knowledge intensive industries.  The top panel reports the variables for industry startups and 
the bottom panel reports the information for university spinoffs.  Based on the number of new 
ventures, university spinoffs are a relatively small proportion of total new ventures in 
knowledge intensive industries, representing only 7.8% of the surviving firms in 2001, the 
date of the survey.  Slightly more than half of these university spinoffs, 52%, involve a 
research academic entrepreneur(s).  Other founding team characteristics are also different 
between industry startups and university spinoffs.  The average size of the founding team is 
larger for university spinoffs, an average of 2.3 FTEs versus 1.6 FTEs, but they also show a 
higher standard deviation than industry startups.  About 90% of the founding team members 
of spinoffs have academic degrees whereas this percentage is only 45.6% for industry 
startups. 
 
Among the characteristics of the new venture companies, university spinoffs are larger and 
appear to focus more on innovation than industry startups.  Spinoffs have an average of 4.5 
FTEs at founding while industry startups have an average of 3.5 FTEs.  University spinoffs 
show larger average values across all the innovation indicators such as patents, R&D 
conducted continuously, and R&D conducted occasionally.  For access to external financial 
capital, however, both spinoffs and industry startups have very similar average credit ratings, 
with only a slightly higher standard deviation for industry startups.  Fewer industry startups 
are organized as legal forms involving some type of limit on liability.  Among the science 
disciplines of the academic entrepreneurs, forty-one percent of university spinoffs have at 
least one founder from a science discipline (477 spinoffs), while thirty-two percent have at 
least one founder from an engineering discipline (371 spinoffs).  Table 1 also shows that a 
much larger proportion of university spinoffs maintain connections to universities, 67.9% 
28.9% respectively.     
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To investigate whether there is a performance premium for university spinoffs we analyzed 
both descriptive statistics and multivariate regression results based on Heckman models 
correcting for potential survivor bias.  The unconditional descriptive results in Table 1 show 
an employment performance premium of 5.6 percentage points, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  The multivariate Heckman selection model results are reported in 
Table 2.11  The Heckman procedure shows that correcting for survival is important.  The 
Inverse Mills Ratio given at the bottom of the table is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
(This correction remains important for all models estimated in our analysis.)  In the first 
column of regression results, conditional on all the covariates except external connections to 
universities, Model 1 shows the dummy variable identifying university spinoffs (AE) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  The magnitude of 0.034 indicates an 
employment performance premium for university spinoffs relative to industry startups of 3.4 
percentage points, which is 2.2 percentage points smaller than the unconditional results.  
When post-foundation university connections are held constant, as shown in Model 2, the 
performance premium is still positive and significant, although its magnitude falls to 2.7 
percentage points.  These results support hypothesis #1.  While policies that incent university 
spinoffs induce a larger social cost than policies incenting industry startups, this larger social 
cost is offset to some degree by producing a larger stream of social benefits, as measured by 
employment growth. 
 
Model 3 in Table 2 splits university spinoffs into those with a research academic entrepreneur 
and those with a non-research academic entrepreneur.  Because the social costs of lost 
knowledge accumulation and disclosure depend of whether the academic entrepreneur 
performs research, from a policy perspective, it is desirable to observe a larger performance 
premium for spinoffs started by research academic entrepreneurs.  This is exactly what the 
results in Model 3 show.  Both types of spinoffs have positive and significant performance 
premiums, but the performance for those with a research academic entrepreneur is 1.5 
percentage points higher.  
 
                                                 
11 As a robustness check, all the models were re-estimated using sampling weights from the survey. These results 
are reported in Table 3. There are no significant differences between weighted and non-weighted results. 
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The field of the academic founder(s) of university spinoffs may also be relevant for 
understanding differences in the performance premium.  In terms of the social cost, future 
research may show that the nature and impact of open science norms vary across academic 
disciplines.  In this case, the necessary performance premium will vary within the group of 
research academic entrepreneurs and not only between research and non-research AEs.  
Whether the social impact of open science is greater in some academic fields or not is 
unknown at this time, but the regression results in Table 2 suggests the performance premium 
disappears for those university spinoffs with at least one academic founder from the 
engineering disciplines.  In all models, the engineering covariate shows a negative and 
significant coefficient.  From Model 3, university spinoffs associated with research academic 
entrepreneurs from the engineering disciplines have a positive point estimate for the 
performance premium of 1.2 percentage points (3.5 minus 2.3), but it is not statistically 
different from zero.  Similarly, for spinoffs with non-research AEs from the engineering 
disciplines, the performance premium is not significantly different from zero.  None of the 
models in Table 2 show a significant offset for spinoffs with at least one founder whose 
knowledge contribution derives from the life and natural science disciplines.  
 
There are some interesting results for the other explanatory variables in Models 1 and 2.  
First, Model 1 suggests that intellectual property in the form of patents, the size of the 
founding team, and the general human capital of the founding team, measured as the 
percentage of the founders with an academic degree, are associated with more employment 
growth.  However, once university connections are held constant in Model 2, all of these 
factors become insignificant for all new ventures, whether it is a university spinoff or an 
industry startup.  This suggests that these covariates act as proxy variables for university 
connections.  Having university connections is associated with a 4.1 percentage point increase 
in employment growth for all new ventures, spinoffs and industry startups.  Among the other 
covariates, the results are as one would expect.  New ventures that perform R&D, those with 
better credit ratings, and those organized as limited liability companies show better 
employment growth.  The initial size of the new venture is negatively related to employment 
growth. 
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5 Conclusion 
Using data on new ventures founded in knowledge intensive industries in Germany and 
controlling for survivor bias, this paper finds that university spinoffs generally show greater 
employment growth than industry startups.  For the overall group of university spinoffs, the 
performance premium is 3.4 percentage points higher employment growth.  By creating more 
new jobs than industry startups, university spinoffs are offsetting their higher social cost, at 
least to some degree.  It is important to remember, however, that achieving a performance 
premium is only a necessary condition to justify spinoff promotion policies.  To calculate net 
social welfare, one needs to weigh the social cost of knowledge accumulation and disclosure 
against the social benefits of new job creation.  Needless to say, this “bottom line” social 
welfare statement is not possible given the state of research in the field.  As research 
progresses, scholars will be able to state the tradeoff between additions to the stock of public 
knowledge and new jobs (or some other performance measure) in terms of quantities, but 
ultimately these quantities will need to be valued to allow a net social gain calculation. 
 
In this paper, university spinoffs are defined as new companies started by former or current 
university employees.  The involvement of the university employee is a critical part of 
whether there is a need for a spinoff performance premium or not.  If university spinoffs are 
defined in terms of a licensed technology or other arms-length transactions, then there is no 
reason to expect any sacrifice of knowledge accumulation or disclosure in the not-for-profit 
research sector.  In this case, a sufficient standard to justify spinoff policies may be that 
spinoffs perform as well as industry startups, on average.12  In other words, no performance 
premium needs to be observed.  Similar reasoning applies when the university employee who 
founds the spinoff is a non-research academic entrepreneur.  The movement of these 
individuals out of the research sector to the private sector would not involve a foregone 
knowledge accumulation and disclosure.  This is the basis of Hypothesis #2 that says the 
                                                 
12 In our empirical analysis, we compared university spinoffs to industry startups based on a random sample that 
was stratified by industry (in particular, knowledge intensive industries), year of company foundation, and 
region.  Other scholars such as Wennberg et al. (2011) compare university spinoffs to corporate spinoffs.  This is 
a subgroup of industry startups that is likely to perform better than average and thereby serves as higher standard 
of comparison for university spinoffs.  For general policy justification, we believe the overall population of 
industry startups (properly stratified) is the relevant control group.  
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performance premium should be larger for research academic entrepreneurs than non-research 
academic entrepreneurs.  Our empirical results show a performance premium for both types, 
but the premium is larger for research academic entrepreneurs, 3.5 and 2.0 percentage points 
respectively. 
 
The analysis also shows that the performance premium varies by the academic composition of 
the university spinoff, which is determined by the academic discipline(s) of the university 
founder(s).  University spinoffs show a performance premium when they have at least one 
academic founder from law & social science or from science-oriented disciplines.  However, 
the results do not show any performance premium for spinoffs that have at least one academic 
entrepreneur from the engineering fields.  These spinoffs experience the same employment 
growth as industry startups.   
 
For policymakers, our research suggests a new perspective on the design and evaluation of 
spinoff policies.  The conventional assumption that university spinoffs are equivalent to 
industry startups is too simplistic.  Both types of new companies may produce similar benefits 
in the private sector, such as new jobs that fuel economic growth, but the social costs of 
creating university startups are larger when these spinoffs result in lost knowledge 
accumulation and disclosure.  At the present time policy designs do not incorporate these 
differences.  Our research also highlights the importance of the individuals who found spinoff 
companies.  Spinoff policies are typically designed to maximize the number of spinoffs 
without understanding how the policy influences the mix of academic founders.  Our research 
suggests that policy designs can be improved by anticipating the mix of academic founders 
who are likely to be influenced by the policy.  Similarly, impact evaluations of spinoff 
policies could be improved by incorporating information on lost knowledge accumulation and 
disclosure.   
 
While our research advances the literature, more research is needed on university spinoffs and 
associated policies.  At the present time, very few studies connect university spinoffs to the 
individual academic researchers who found these firms.  For instance, the literature 
characterizing changes in academic research productivity as a result of entrepreneurial 
behaviors such as spinoff creation is too narrowly focused on science and engineering fields.  
Academic researchers in law, social sciences, and other fields make contributions to open 
science.  A better characterization of the potential losses to open science from spinoff activity 
 22 
will require this additional work.  For the spinoffs, moving beyond employment growth to 
include multiple firm-level performance indicators will allow a more complete understanding 
of the spectrum of benefits created by spinoffs.  Future research could also expand the types 
of spinoffs and industry startups used in the analysis.  For instance, Wennberg et al. (2011) 
compare university spinoffs to corporate spinoffs. 
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Appendix I: Definition of Technology Sectors 
High-tech manufacturing: This sector comprises manufacturing activities characterized by 
high R&D inputs and includes the following NACE rev. 1.1 codes:  24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 35 (chemicals and pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, computer and 
office machinery, electrical equipment, electronics, medical and measurement 
instruments, automotive and other vehicles). 
Technology-oriented services: This sector covers services that are heavily relying on the use 
of new technology, particularly information and communication technology, and 
includes the NACE rev. 1.1 codes:  62.3, 72, 73, 74.2, 74.3, 92.11 (telecommunication, 
computer services and software, R&D services, engineering, testing, film making). 
Knowledge-intensive consulting: This sector represents services that are largely based on high 
qualified labor while relying less on new technology and includes NACE rev. 1.1 codes:  
74.1, 74.4, 74.85.1, 74.85.2, 74.87.2, 74.87.4, (business consulting, advertising, design 
activities, etc.) 
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Appendix II: Tables 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics by Industry Startups and University Spinoffs 
Industry Startups (non-USOs) = 13693 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Employment growth (average annual) 0.092 0.162 -0.448 0.805
Founding team characteristics  
    Size of founding team 1.579 1.045 1 15
    Percent founding team members with 
    academic degrees 0.456 0.466 0 1
New venture characteristics  
    Employees at founding (FTE) 3.487 4.684 0.5 50
    Patent 0.018 0.134 0 1
    R&D (continuous) 0.165 0.371 0 1
    R&D (occasional) 0.101 0.301 0 1
    Credit rating at founding 2.670 0.464 1.46 6
    Limited liability company 0.375 0.484 0 1
External environment characteristics  
    University connections (any type) 0.288 0.453 0 1
  
 
University Spinoffs (USOs) = 1151 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Employment growth (average annual) 0.148 0.186 -0.418 0.805
Founding team characteristics  
    Research AEs 0.520 0.500 0 1
    Non-research AEs 0.480 0.500 0 1
    Size of founding team 2.333 1.384 1 15
    Percentage of founding team with 
    academic degrees 0.901 0.200 0.067 1
New venture characteristics  
    Founders’ discipline: Science 0.414 0.493 0 1
    Founders’ discipline: Engineering  0.322 0.468 0 1
    Employees at founding (FTE) 4.453 4.981 0.5 50
    Patent 0.071 0.257 0 1
    R&D (continuous) 0.400 0.490 0 1
    R&D (occasional) 0.170 0.376 0 1
    Credit rating at founding 2.654 0.385 1.77 6
    Limited liability company 0.615 0.487 0 1
External environment characteristics  
    University connections (any type) 0.679 0.467 0 1
Note: Eight industry dummy variables and five founding year cohort dummy variables are not reported. 
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Table 2:  Startup employment growth (1996-2000), Heckman selection models 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Academic Entrepreneur (AE) 0.034*** 0.027***  
 (0.008) (0.008)  
Research AE   0.035 *** 
   (0.009) 
Non-Research AE   0.020 ** 
   (0.009) 
Founders’ discipline: Sciences 0.004 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Founders’ discipline: Engineering -0.022** -0.023** -0.023 ** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
University Connections  0.041*** 0.041 *** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Patent (yes/no) 0.016* 0.012 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Firm R&D (continuous) 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.046 *** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm R&D (occasional) 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.026 *** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Percentage of Founding Team 
with Academic degrees 0.009*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Size of Founding Team 0.002* 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employees at Founding -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004 *** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Credit rating at Founding -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009 *** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Limited Liability Comp. 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.030 *** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Intercept 0.092*** 0.088*** 0.088 *** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Founding year dummy variables Y Y Y 
Industry dummy variables Y Y Y 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.050*** -0.047*** -0.046*** 
Total Observations 23803 23803 23803 
Censored Observations 8959 8959 8959 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). All second stage 
regressions include industry and founding year dummy variables. 
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Table 3:  Startup employment growth (1996-2000),  
    Heckman selection models using sampling weights 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Academic Entrepreneur (AE) 0.036*** 0.029***  
 (0.009) (0.009)  
Research AE   0.034 *** 
   (0.011) 
Non-Research AE   0.025 ** 
   (0.010) 
Founders’ discipline: Sciences -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Founders’ discipline: Engineering -0.025** -0.025** -0.026 ** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
University Connections  0.044*** 0.044 *** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Patent (yes/no) 0.024** 0.021* 0.020 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm R&D (continuous) 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.047 *** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm R&D (occasional) 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.028 *** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Percentage of Founding Team 
with Academic degrees 0.011*** 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Size of Founding Team 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Employees at Founding -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003 *** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Credit rating at Founding -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007 *** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Limited Liability Comp. 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.035 *** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Intercept 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.066 *** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Founding year dummy variables Y Y Y 
Industry dummy variables Y Y Y 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
Total Observations 23803 23803 23803 
Censored Observations 8959 8959 8959 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). All second stage 
regressions include industry and founding year dummy variables. 
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